Introduction
Eurasia is passing through a remarkably transformative period against the background of intensifying geopolitical confrontation between the major powers. The South Caucasus is not an exception. The present geopolitical dynamics and power balance in this region are today rather different from those that existed just a couple of years ago. These developments shape the foreign policy strategies of the regional countries, including that of Azerbaijan.
Over the past few months, Azerbaijan’s security landscape and foreign policy have undergone significant developments. Following the unexpected and premature withdrawal of Russia’s peacekeeping mission from Karabakh in April 2024, another notable milestone in the country’s foreign policy occurred in August 2024, when Baku formally applied for BRICS membership (Apa.az, August 20, 2024). BRICS is an intergovernmental cooperation platform comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, along with four new members – Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. This announcement followed Azerbaijan’s initial plan to join the bloc, revealed in the China-Azerbaijan joint declaration on establishing a strategic partnership, adopted by the two countries’ leaders on July 3 during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Astana. The declaration highlights Azerbaijan’s intent to join BRICS and emphasizes China’s support for this initiative (President.az, July 3, 2024).
Thus, Azerbaijan has joined a list of more than 30 countries seeking membership in the bloc. Most notably for Baku, Türkiye, Azerbaijan’s closest security ally, has also expressed interest in joining. While the declaration of intent is significant in terms of these countries’ foreign policy orientations and warrants closer scrutiny, Azerbaijan’s full membership is not anticipated in the near future. Notably, Azerbaijan was not among the thirteen countries granted partner status – the first step before full membership – at the BRICS summit held in Kazan, Russia, from October 22 to 24, 2024.
This application, nevertheless, surprised many observers, as Azerbaijan has traditionally been recognized as a successful example of balanced and neutral foreign policy. In response, Azerbaijani government representatives were quick to clarify that Baku’s BRICS membership bid does not signal a departure from its commitment to multilateralism and balanced approach in foreign policy.
Despite this, alongside the rapprochement between Azerbaijan and the “East,” there has been a deterioration in Azerbaijan’s relations with the West, particularly with the United States. This shift has been influenced by several factors, including the growing anti-Azerbaijani rhetoric from the US officials, especially following Azerbaijan’s anti-terror measures in Karabakh against the Armenian separatist entity in September 2023. Additionally, the re-imposition of sanctions against Azerbaijan under the 907 amendment, after more than 20 years of waivers, and the negative impact of the Russia-West confrontation on Azerbaijan’s relations with the US have contributed to the strain. In July, President Aliyev expressed frustration over the challenges in the US-Azerbaijan relations, criticizing the Biden administration for what he called “unrealistic demands” from Azerbaijan (President.az, July 20, 2024). His comments followed a statement by James O’Brien, an Assistant Secretary of State, who asserted that the US wanted the Zangezur corridor to be opened without Russian involvement, noting that Washington seeks to use this corridor to reduce Central Asian dependence on Russia and China (Radar.am, June 27, 2024).
We’ve also seen growing tensions with the European Union. In October 2024, the European Parliament adopted another resolution criticizing Azerbaijan, urging the European Commission to reconsider its energy cooperation with Azerbaijan due to both political issues and Armenia-Azerbaijan relations (Europarl.europa.eu, October 23, 2024). Unlike previous, more restrained responses, a European Commission official, the European Social Rights Commissioner, also openly criticized Baku (Politico.eu, October 23, 2024). Tensions between Azerbaijan and the European Union escalated following Azerbaijan’s September 2023 operations in Karabakh. While all European countries recognize Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan, many political circles within these countries criticized Azerbaijan’s use of force in efforts to restore its sovereignty over the region. This led to several setbacks in relations between Azerbaijan and the West, including the suspension of Azerbaijan’s participation in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in January 2024 (Coe.int, January 25, 2024).
These developments raise questions about the future of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy stance. Is Azerbaijan drifting away from the West toward alignment with Russia and China? Can the above-mentioned developments be characterized as an upcoming disconnection between the West and Azerbaijan, at least in geopolitical terms?
This article is an attempt to shed light on the ongoing shift in the region and ensuing adjustments in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. It aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy course based on the statements of the Azerbaijani leaders and the publications of the country’s expert community. It is argued that Azerbaijan is avoiding any alignment with one power bloc against the other and as such seeking to pursue balanced partnership with all great powers without comprising the country’s independence and sovereignty. The article also aims to develop policy recommendations for the foreign policy executives, who are considered in this article as the heads of governments and foreign ministers in the European Union and the United States. These recommendations are designed to raise awareness about the security challenges Azerbaijan, and likewise other the countries of the South Caucasus, are facing and the security concerns they have.
Problems in Azerbaijan’s Relations with its Western Partners
The disagreements between Azerbaijan and the country’s Western partners have been caused by multiple reasons. It is no coincidence that the relationship between the two sides deteriorated dramatically following Azerbaijan’s liberation of Karabakh in September 2023 that resulted in the collapse of the Armenian separatist regime. Despite the fact that the Karabakh region is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, and Baku had strived to peacefully de-occupy this region for three decades, some political circles in the West criticized Azerbaijan for the use of force against the separatist regime and sought to take punitive measures.
It was a shock to the Azerbaijani people that the United States began to reimpose sanctions on Azerbaijan under the 907 Amendment to the Freedom Support Act of 1992. The amendment, adopted on October 24, 1992 at the initiative of the pro-Armenian political groups (Ambrosio 2001: 146), bars the United States from offering assistance to Azerbaijan unless Baku takes “demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh” (Congress.gov, October 24, 1992). The United States has granted annual waivers for this amendment since 2002. That year, Baku permitted Washington to use its territory to supply the US troops in Afghanistan.
In November 2023, in the aftermath of Azerbaijan’s anti-terror measures against the separatist regime in the Karabakh region (September 19-20, 2023), the United States announced that Washington would reconsider its relations with Azerbaijan. Speaking during “The Future of Nagorno-Karabakh” hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Europe on November 15, US Assistant Secretary of State James O’Brien stated that it cannot be business as usual with Azerbaijan without significant progress in the peace talks: “We’ve canceled a number of high-level visits, condemned [Baku’s] actions, and [canceled] the 907 waiver. We don’t anticipate submitting a waiver until such time as we see a real improvement in the situation” (YouTube, November 15, 2023).
O’Brien’s statement stirred ire in Baku. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry responded, “It turns out that the US side has always considered the support of Azerbaijan as occasional, while it should be remembered that history has always repeated itself.” The government ministry also reminded Washington of Azerbaijan’s numerous contributions to the US counterterrorist efforts following 9/11 (Mfa.gov.az, November 16, 2023).
The Azerbaijani government has long considered the 907 amendment a major setback in Azerbaijani-US relations. Baku has consistently criticized the measure because it was adopted when Azerbaijan, not Armenia, was under occupation. Farid Shafiyev, chairman of the Baku-based Center for Analysis of International Relations, recently posted on X (formerly Twitter), “Let’s recall that the 907 amendment was adopted on 24 October 1992—the year when the Azerbaijani city Shusha was occupied by Armenian forces” (X.com, November 16, 2023).
In parallel, the calls for more sanctions against Azerbaijan were heard from multiple sources – largely driven by the pro-Armenian political groups (Armenpress.am, October 3, 2024). For instance, in early October, sixty congressmen of the United States sent a bipartisan letter to the State Department calling for the US leadership in holding Azerbaijan “accountable for committing war crimes, taking hostages and illegally occupying Armenian territory” (Anca.org, October 3, 2024). This raised many questions why these politicians and officials in the United States and other Western countries never condemned Armenia and never called for holding it accountable when Yerevan forcibly displaced more than 700,000 Azerbaijanis at gunshot and kept the country’s internationally recognized territories under occupation for three decades. These double standards further widened the gap between Azerbaijan and the West with immediate effect on Baku’s calculations in foreign policy (Azertag.az, October 5, 2024).
We’ve also seen tensions between Azerbaijan and the European Union. In October 2024, the European Parliament adopted another resolution criticizing Azerbaijan, urging the European Commission to reconsider its energy cooperation with Azerbaijan due to both political issues and Armenia-Azerbaijan relations (Europarl.europa.eu, October 23, 2024). However, unlike previous, more restrained responses, a European Commission official, the European Social Rights Commissioner, joined the statement of the European Parliament criticizing the Azerbaijani government for alleged human rights situation in the country in October 2024 (Politico.eu, October 23, 2024). “Such a harmful approach by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Parliament has long ago proved to be ineffective and leading nowhere, does nothing but complicate the Azerbaijan-European relations”, said Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its response (Apa.az, October 23, 2024).
The deterioration of relations were intensified by geopolitical factors. One major issue in this context is related with the instrumentalization of the regional transportation corridors for geopolitical purposes. The United States has made it clear that Washington expects Azerbaijan to support the Western initiatives to reduce dependency of the Central Asian states on Russia and China by providing an alternative transportation passage along its territory and Zangezur corridor (EDM, July 9, 2024). The United States views the establishment of peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan in a larger geopolitical perspective characterizing it as a vital piece in the efforts to reduce dependency of Armenia and Central Asia on Washington’s opponents.
In June 2024, James O’Brien, Assistant Secretary of State of the United States, stated it clearly at the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The countries of Central Asia “now export to the world either through China or Russia. To find an alternative, they have to go through Azerbaijan,” he said, adding that the road through Azerbaijan and Armenia (also known as Zangezur corridor) can provide an alternative, and a “potentially much larger” one, to the existing route through Georgia (Radar.am, June 27, 2024). He emphasized that there is a need for a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to operationalize the new road. “We are clear with President Aliyev that it is time for peace, and it is not only the issue of Azerbaijan but the entire region and Central Asia,” Deputy Secretary stated.
The importance for the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty for the connectivity across the region was underscored also by Secretary Blinken at a conversation on the US Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution on July 2. A peace agreement can create “a tremendous opportunity for economic connectivity, for economic growth, for connecting countries both east, west, north, and south. Azerbaijan has a critical role to play in that,” said the US’s top diplomat (Azertag, July 2, 2024). Earlier, on November 15, 2023, Deputy Secretary O’Brien had said that the transit corridor through Armenia should be built with the “involvement and consent” of Armenia, while pointing out that the “transit corridor created some other way, by force or involvement of Iran will… be met with a strong reaction” (EDM, November 27, 2023).
Thus, the United States does not support the Aras Corridor project of Azerbaijan and Iran, that would create an alternative to the Zangezur corridor through the territory of Iran (EDM, January 10, 2024). The USA opposes also the involvement of the Russian Federal Security Service’s (FSB) Border Guard Service in the Zangezur corridor as a party to exercise “control over transport” as envisioned by the trilateral [Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan] statement of November 10, 2020 (EDM, April 15, 2024).
In May 2024, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reiterated his opposition to the involvement of Russia saying that the November 2020 statement stipulates that “the monitoring of transport communication is provided by the Russian Federation” (News.am, May 7, 2024). He added that this “does not in any way mean that Russia should be on the ground because one of the ways to exercise that monitoring is that, for example, Armenia may regularly report that communication is secured; that is, the agreement is fulfilled”. Pashinyan’s statement seems to be at odds with the wording of the trilateral statement which states that “Control over transport shall be exercised by the bodies of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service (FSB) of Russia” (President.az, November 10, 2020).
The intensification of the geopolitical dimensions of the peace process in such a confrontational mode and the potential implications of a peace treaty to the regional power dynamics have seriously complicated the peace treaty perspectives between Baku and Yerevan as well. This is one of the reasons, if not the most fundamental reason, why the two countries have so far failed to sign a peace treaty. As the US officials acknowledge, it is not only a matter of the Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and is viewed externally as an issue that can have a critical impact on the larger rivalries between the United States and its geopolitical foes.
Azerbaijan, traditionally an advocate of maintaining balance between great powers and as such pursuing multilateralism, is rather reluctant to take a role in these risky adventures. The hopes of the United States for Azerbaijan’s cooperation in the Western efforts to use the Middle corridor and Zangezur corridor against Russia and China were, therefore, characterized as “unrealistic demands” by the Azerbaijani president. It is clear that such an adventurous move of the Azerbaijani government would place the country in an overt confrontation with Russia and China with dangerous consequences for the country’s security.
Disconnection with the West?
To begin, it is important to highlight the geographic constraints within which Azerbaijan’s foreign policy operates. Sandwiched between Russia to the north and Iran to the south, Azerbaijan faces significant challenges that shape its foreign policy considerations. In this context, the West has consistently been, throughout the entire post-Soviet period, a crucial counterbalancing partner for Azerbaijan. Large-scale energy projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor would not have been possible without the support of the United States. President Aliyev has explicitly acknowledged this on numerous occasions (President.az, May 3, 2023).
These dynamics remain unchanged today. In Baku, there is a clear understanding that severing ties with the West would jeopardize Azerbaijan’s independence and risk its gradual submission to the influence of other powers. Therefore, abandoning its hard-won sovereignty and independence would be an irrational course of action for Azerbaijan.
However, Baku finds itself in a precarious situation affected by the transactional character of the US foreign policy, the anti-Azerbaijani statements and actions of the West, and, last but not least, the implications of the growing geopolitical confrontation across the region. The disregard by the Western powers to the three-decades long occupation of the internationally recognized territories of Azerbaijan and the refusal of the Armenian side to resolve this conflict peacefully has created a rather toxic atmosphere for the relations between the sides. In parallel, the “unrealistic demands” from Azerbaijan to support the Western efforts to curb the regional influence of Russia and China have not been welcomed in Baku.
Thus, Azerbaijan expects the United States, NATO, and the EU to adopt a more realistic and just foreign policy that acknowledges Azerbaijan’s concerns, threats, and limitations. Azerbaijan’s foreign policy over the past several years has demonstrated that Baku neither seeks to fall under the influence of any single power nor wishes to be used as a pawn in broader geopolitical rivalries. Committed to its traditionally balanced approach, Azerbaijan’s leaders and experts envision the South Caucasus as a bridge between major powers, leveraging its geostrategic position for the benefit of all regional countries. Baku reaffirmed this commitment in April 2024 when, to the surprise of many observers, it successfully terminated Russia’s peacekeeping mission in the Karabakh region (EDM, April 22, 2024). This marked a historic milestone for Azerbaijan: for the first time in over 200 years, there are no foreign troops stationed on Azerbaijani soil. Moreover, Azerbaijan has now become the only country in the Eastern Partnership region without any external military forces present on its territory, underscoring its dedication to sovereignty and independence, as well as its success in foreign policy.
Hence, Azerbaijan does not see its membership to BRICS and close partnership with Russia, China, and Central Asian countries as a departure from the cooperation with the West. “Close partners of the United States, like India and United Arab Emirates, are members of BRICS which clearly shows that this bloc is not strictly an anti-Western, but more a movement that promotes multilateralism in international relations”, said Farid Shafiyev, Chairman of the Center of Analysis of International Relations (AIR Center), a Baku-based political think-tank founded by the government of Azerbaijan (EDM, October 16, 2024). According to Mahur Gasimov, head of the Department of Analysis and Strategic Research at Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry, BRICS’ principles of multilateralism and inclusiveness align with Azerbaijan’s overall objectives (Aircenter.az, April 8, 2024).
Thus, if admitted as a full member, Azerbaijan’s position is likely to align more with that of India and Brazil who reject the attempt of Russia and China to transform BRICS into an anti-Western bloc (Foreignaffairs.com, September 24, 2024). This position of Azerbaijan is also affected by the country’s economic interests. Economy is often noted as another area that encourages Baku’s application for BRICS membership. It is estimated that BRICS+, the informal name given to the organization after the admission of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates, now represents 37.3% of the global GDP – more than double that of the European Union, which stands at 14.5% (Europarl.europa.eu, March 15, 2024). This makes the organization an attractive economic center for developing countries.
Azerbaijani experts believe that the country’s participation within this bloc would enhance the country’s trade relations with other member states and draw more investments to Azerbaijan (Bakuresearchinstitute.org, September 9, 2024). Located on the crossroads of major transportation corridors including the International North-South Transportation Corridor and the Middle Corridor, the closer cooperation within the BRICS is believed to make contributions to Azerbaijan’s economy, in particular, the country’s efforts to alleviate its dependency on oil and gas revenues and get access to the investments of New Development Bank, a multilateral development bank of BRICS (Bakuresearchinstitute.org, September 9, 2024).
While the BRICS members constitute around 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s total trade turnover, the Azerbaijan’s partners in the West, including Israel and Türkiye, make approximately 80 percent (Azernews.az, August 24, 2024). This is the reason why it is not surprising that Azerbaijan has sought to expand diplomatic engagements with EU member states over the past two years. Within the first ten days of May, Baku hosted two European leaders, from Slovakia and Bulgaria, resulting in the signing of significant agreements aimed at enhancing and broadening bilateral relations.
On 6 May, Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico paid a visit to Azerbaijan for the first time in his political career. The sides signed important agreements in the course of this visit which opened a new chapter in the relations between Azerbaijan and Slovakia. Slovakia has become the 10th member of the EU with which Azerbaijan signed declaration on strategic partnership (President.az, May 7, 2024). Azerbaijan has earlier launched strategic partnership with Romania (2011), Croatia (2013), Italy (2014), Hungary (2014), Czech Republic (2015), Bulgaria (2015), Poland (2017), Latvia (2017) and Lithuania (2017). This constitutes more than one-third of the EU members and provides a good basis for the relations between the sides.
Energy sector remains a key area of cooperation in Azerbaijan’s relations with the EU. “Azerbaijan currently exports its natural gas to eight countries, and I hope that Slovakia will be the ninth”, said President Aliyev in his press conference with Prime Minister Fico in Baku. One major step in this direction was made in April 2023, when Azerbaijan signed a document called “Solidarity Ring” with Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. The document envisages the expansion of the gas network in Eastern Europe for the delivery of the Azerbaijani gas to other members of the EU. This initiative is based on the Declaration of strategic partnership between the EU and Azerbaijan in the field of gas and energy, that was signed in July 2022 and envisions the increase of the Azerbaijani gas exports to the EU from 12bcm to 20bcm by the end of 2027. “I believe we will achieve this goal”, President Aliyev said confidently in the press conference with the Slovakian premier.
That said, Azerbaijan expands bilateral engagement with many other members of the European Union. On April 28, President Aliyev gave similar messages during his visit to Berlin, where he met German leaders and discussed various avenues for the deepening of relations. This approach in relations has proved to be productive also with the Eastern European countries. It is quite telling that Bulgaria’s President Rumen Radev arrived in Baku for an official visit hours before the departure of the Slovakian leader. A joint declaration on Strengthening Strategic Partnership between the two countries was signed during this visit on May 8. “We are meeting for the fourth time in the last period. Our political dialogue at the highest level creates a good base. This cooperation contributes to Europe’s energy security. Azerbaijan has become an important decisive partner for Bulgaria in the field of energy”, stated President Radev in his joint press conference with President Aliyev. Energy is, however, not the only key domain of cooperation, anymore. Today, there are multiple economic and geopolitical interests that necessitate closer ties between the EU and Azerbaijan.
Conclusion
The analysis presented in this article demonstrates that Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is rooted in a pragmatic approach shaped by the country’s geopolitical realities. Sandwiched between regional powers such as Russia and Iran, Azerbaijan has consistently employed a strategic balancing act to maintain its sovereignty and independence while engaging constructively with the global community. This paper underscores that Azerbaijan’s multilateral efforts do not constitute a rejection of Western partnerships; rather, they reflect a calculated attempt to navigate the competing interests of global and regional actors, ensuring the nation’s autonomy and stability. In this context, adjusting the policies of Western actors to the realities of a region influenced by the presence of Russia and Iran would contribute to fostering deeper ties between the three South Caucasus countries and their Western partners, without jeopardizing stability in the region.
One pivotal step for Western policymakers is addressing the long-standing issue of the 907 Amendment to the US Freedom Support Act. This provision, which conditions the US assistance to Azerbaijan on demonstrable steps regarding its conflict with Armenia, has long been viewed as an unfair and outdated constraint. The amendment fails to reflect the realities on the ground and continues to hinder trust between Azerbaijan and the United States. Its repeal would serve as a critical confidence-building measure, signaling Washington’s commitment to a balanced and forward-looking relationship. This gesture would not only recognize Azerbaijan’s sovereignty but also acknowledge its vital role in bolstering global energy security and contributing to international counterterrorism efforts.
Moreover, Western countries must adopt a more nuanced and realistic approach to regional connectivity initiatives. Azerbaijan occupies a pivotal position in Eurasian transportation and energy networks, notably the Middle Corridor, which links Europe and Asia via the South Caucasus. While the West may view such projects as instruments to counter the influence of Russia and Iran, an overly confrontational or prescriptive approach risks alienating Azerbaijan and destabilizing the region. Instead, Western engagement should focus on inclusive and pragmatic collaboration that aligns with the strategic priorities of the South Caucasus states. Supporting the Middle Corridor in a manner that respects their geopolitical sensitivities would enhance its role as a bridge between East and West, fostering regional integration and mutual benefit without exacerbating tensions with neighboring powers.
This recalibrated Western approach requires a shift in priorities. Engagement with Azerbaijan should not demand rigid alignment against regional actors but rather encourage constructive partnerships that address shared challenges, such as energy diversification, trade facilitation, and regional security. Recognizing the agency of the South Caucasus countries and respecting their independent foreign policy choices will enable the West to build a stronger, more sustainable relationship with Baku, Yerevan, and Tbilisi. In doing so, the West can support a stable South Caucasus that contributes to broader regional peace and cooperation while advancing its own strategic interests.
