The relationship between the United States and ‘Europe’, a broad term which increasingly requires clarification, remains an integral part of contemporary international affairs. In addition to the volume and geopolitical significance of the ties per se, the ‘state’ of affairs between these two centers of power plays a key role in influencing the balance of power in international affairs. ‘Europe’s’ relationship with its transatlantic partner has traditionally been managed and shaped by a leadership group composed of the continent’s most influential actors. This status can be attributed to the European Union but also, and most importantly in this context, ‘minilateral’ formats such as the E3 grouping, composed of France, Britain and Germany, or the ‘Weimar Triangle’, composed of France, Germany and Poland.
Since Donald Trump’s re-election as President of the United States, the issue of European unity has been at the forefront of geopolitical analyses and discussion. This has, in large part, been caused by the Trump administration’s skepticism of the transatlantic alliance and its suitability for dealing with contemporary challenges. Whether it’s over direct challenges to transatlantic security, such as the Ukraine war or the fight against international terrorism, or ‘everyday’ elements such as investment into mutual defense frameworks, the White House has not proven too eager to engage directly with its European counterparts over issues concerning mutual security.
In fact, since his return to office, Donald Trump has placed the pursuit of global peace at the heart of his foreign affairs agenda, dedicating considerable time to mediating between conflicting parties. There are numerous examples, with the US administration’s energy and vision serving as a key catalyst for the normalization process between Azerbaijan and Armenia, further underlining the failure of other international mechanisms like the OSCE Minsk Group to achieve tangible progress. President Trump’s ‘go it alone’ approach is evidenced by his solitary meetings with President Putin of Russia and President Zelenskyy of Ukraine, but also his insistence on face-to-face talks with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The majority of these meetings were held without European leaders, which directly challenges the traditional assumption that Europe’s and America’s common challenges require common solutions.
This broader change in how one interprets transatlantic security has immediately influenced European affairs, something which has extended to the ‘leadership’ circles mentioned above. Although every bilateral or minilateral framework differs, the UK-France relationship can serve as a useful example of how changes in the external geopolitical environment can bring two regional powers closer together. Although both London and Paris undoubtedly view themselves as allies, their relationship has been far from straightforward. However, in times of maximum pressure and geopolitical transformation, common challenges have the tendency to either neutralize points of disagreement or introduce new avenues for cooperation. The UK-France relationship is a prime example of such a relationship, the reinvigoration of which can serve to strengthen European security in periods of critical importance for international relations.
A UK-led Process?
In the UK’s case, the abovementioned dynamics carry particular significance given London’s status as Washington’s closest ally, with the two sharing a world-leading intelligence relationship and operating within the framework of a ‘special relationship.’ Nevertheless, the Labour government has always made it clear that reconfiguring the UK’s relationship with the EU and its broader position within Europe was always going to be among its leading foreign policy priorities. This position was reinforced further after Donald Trump’s return to office, with Keir Starmer, despite enjoying a generally positive relationship with the US leader, consistently emphasizing the importance of European cooperation in the face of numerous threats facing the continent. Since then, along with a ‘collective’ push by the E3 group to harmonize responses to global challenges, the UK’s actions have served to revitalize cooperation on specific agendas between European nations in bilateral formats.
Within the first year of the Keir Starmer government, the UK has pursued a targeted ‘re-approximation’ with its European allies. This includes both the E3 framework but also on a bilateral basis, with UK-EU, UK-France and UK-Germany summits all held in recent months. Although such contacts form part of regular European cooperation, they are, on this occasion, not occurring in a vacuum. Having carried out a profound assessment of its role within the transatlantic alliance, the United States has essentially forced Europe to re-visit the core tenets of its security framework. As a result, leading European NATO members have shown considerably more energy in addressing existing concerns. For instance, one can observe a clear inclination toward greater spending commitments, including the carrying out of strategic defense reviews aimed at raising the level of military operability, as in the UK’s case. Moreover, the countries are beginning to emphasize, in a more pronounced and assertive tone, the importance of collective security. Bilateral treaties, such as the one signed between the UK and France and the UK and Germany, are establishing bilateral mechanisms which address matters requiring urgent reform and are free from bureaucratic complexities. Third, the spread of this spirit has generated tangible outcomes, with one example being the demonstration of greater responsiveness to dealing with both immediate and long-term threats, such as those posed by Russian drone activity in Eastern Europe. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s pledge for a ‘drone wall’ to be built in response to hybrid threats and the extent to which this turns out to be a collective effort will be an important litmus test in the upcoming period.
These processes, however, cannot be analyzed in isolation. Even if the US and European capitals still occasionally express a willingness to tackle existential challenges together, as evidenced by the invitation of European leaders to the August 2025 meeting between President Trump and President Zelenskyy in the White House, there is a broad and definitive acceptance that European security can no longer rely on Washington’s willingness to lead the transatlantic alliance. The UK, despite being in a unique position given its historic status as Washington’s closest ally in Europe, recognizes this, which among several other factors is evidenced by its rapprochement with countries like France.
UK-France Relations
Brexit served as a unique turning point in the relationship between the United Kingdom and France. Once closely intertwined through EU institutions, the UK now attempts to navigate its foreign policy more independently while seeking areas of convergence with key European powers. France, meanwhile, asserts itself as a central player in shaping the EU’s external relations and security agenda. For decades prior to Brexit, the UK and France had cooperated within the EU framework, influencing continental decisions on defense, trade, and migration. Post-Brexit, the UK’s foreign policy priorities shifted, emphasizing sovereignty and global reach, while France doubled down on EU integration. Yet in 2025, the evolving international landscape—marked by the protracted war in Ukraine, transatlantic uncertainty, and a growing migration crisis—has prompted a re-evaluation of these trajectories. The evolving cooperation between the UK and France—whether bilateral or EU-mediated—signals cautious steps toward rebuilding trust and fostering strategic cohesion in Europe.
Historical Trajectory: From Entente Cordiale to Brexit Fault Lines
UK–France relations have always carried a dual character, with partnership traditionally mixed with rivalry resulting in an often turbulent bilateral agenda. In certain instances, the two countries often found themselves competing for influence in Europe and beyond; in other periods, moments of strategic necessity pulled them closer together. A turning point came with the Saint-Malo Declaration of 1998, when Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Jacques Chirac agreed to develop Europe’s capacity for autonomous defense. This laid the groundwork for the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and signaled that, despite their differences, the two sides could act as a joint engine for European security when circumstances demanded it.
During the United Kingdom’s years within the European Union, cooperation with France on foreign and security policy was frequent but not always uniform. The two states often worked together on counterterrorism, sanctions, and defense coordination, yet diverged sharply during major international crises such as the wars in Yugoslavia and Iraq. These episodes revealed enduring differences: the UK’s foreign policy remained centered on the transatlantic alliance, prioritizing its partnership with the United States, while France consistently advocated for a stronger, more autonomous European voice.
The 2016 Brexit referendum and Britain’s formal withdrawal from the EU in 2020 deepened this divergence. Political and diplomatic trust weakened amid disputes over fishing rights, migration controls, and the 2021 AUKUS defense pact, when Britain and the United States struck a submarine deal with Australia that sidelined France. Paris interpreted this as evidence of Britain’s strategic detachment from Europe. For London, however, Brexit represented a step toward a “Global Britain” identity, enabling it to pursue a broader range of economic partnerships around the world and minimize its reliance on its “traditional” allies.
The beginning of the Ukraine war in 2022, however, fundamentally altered this trajectory. Faced with renewed threats to European security, the UK and France found themselves once again cooperating closely within NATO and regional defense frameworks. The conflict, crucially, led to renewed conversations about defense spending, with Anglo-Franco-German coordination at the heart of the ‘coalition of the willing’ driving the process. Hence, today, the UK and France, as nuclear powers and permanent UN Security Council members, continue to balance rivalry with responsibility, recognizing that shared security imperatives can override political differences when continental stability is at stake.
In Search of a ‘Common Ground’ on Border Security
Migration has long been one of the most delicate and politically charged issues in the relationship between the United Kingdom and France. In recent years, the English Channel has turned into a focal point of their bilateral agenda, reflecting not only humanitarian and legal dilemmas but also broader questions about sovereignty and shared responsibility. Official figures from the UK Home Office show that during the first half of 2025, nearly 20,000 people crossed the Channel to reach the British coast — the highest number ever recorded for this period and a sharp increase compared to the previous year. By early July, the total number of arrivals had already surpassed 21,000, confirming the scale of the challenge facing both governments.
Amid mounting pressure on both sides of the Channel, Prime Minister Keir Starmer and President Emmanuel Macron met in London on 10 July 2025 for a high-level summit focused primarily on migration and border management. The meeting resulted in the announcement of a new pilot arrangement, informally known as the “one-in, one-out” deal. Under the plan, France would take back a limited number of irregular arrivals from the UK — around 50 individuals per week — while Britain, in turn, would accept an equivalent number of people eligible for family reunification or humanitarian admission from French territory. Although the agreement officially came into effect in September 2025, its implementation has faced several obstacles, including legal appeals and logistical challenges which delayed some of the initial deportation flights. Nevertheless, the arrangement remains a significant step: it shows that London and Paris can find practical compromises even on divisive issues, relying on bilateral coordination rather than wider ‘European’ mechanisms.
For France, migration control continues to be viewed through the lens of domestic security, while the UK sees it as an integral part of its post-Brexit border policy and political accountability. The “one-in, one-out” arrangement therefore reflects more than just a policy experiment, symbolizing how both countries are learning to manage shared challenges in a changing Europe.
Defense and Strategic Autonomy
Defense continues to form the backbone of cooperation between the United Kingdom and France. Despite political friction in the post-Brexit period, both countries remain among the most capable military powers in Europe and continue to act as leading contributors within NATO. On 24 March 2025, senior British and French military officials met in London to discuss joint approaches to European security, Ukraine, and defense innovation—a continuation of the high-level dialogue between the two defense chiefs first initiated after the Lancaster House agreements.
The publication of the UK’s Strategic Defence Review in 2025, titled Making Britain Safer: Secure at Home, Strong Abroad, represented a major policy milestone. The review confirmed Britain’s plan to increase defense spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027, with the 2024–25 defense budget amounting to approximately £60 billion. The move was designed to strengthen Britain’s leadership within NATO and reassure European partners of its ongoing commitment to continental security.
The war in Ukraine has proven to be an important catalyst, with both nations seemingly unwavering in their support to Ukraine’s military. Joint deployments in the Baltic states and the Eastern Mediterranean have served as practical “testing grounds” for how well their forces can operate together outside of EU frameworks. Platforms such as the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)—which brings together northern European allies—offer the flexibility both sides value: a coalition of the willing, free from EU bureaucracy but still complementary to NATO.
From the French perspective, Brexit was not seen as a moment of liberation but rather as a loss for Europe’s collective strength and strategic coherence. Under President Emmanuel Macron, France has positioned itself as the principal advocate of European strategic autonomy, promoting the idea that Europe must rely less on external powers and act more independently in matters of security and defense. Through the 2017 Sorbonne speech and the 2022 Versailles Declaration, Macron expressed his ambition to make the EU a more decisive geopolitical actor. In his 2025 address on European rearmament, Macron reaffirmed that “the future of Europe is not going to be decided by Russia or by Washington,” underscoring his determination to strengthen Europe’s defense capabilities and, as a result, its political agency. He has also emphasized France’s nuclear deterrent as both a symbol of sovereignty and a guarantee of continental security. He has urged stronger defense spending and closer industrial cooperation through EU mechanisms like the European Defence Fund and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), aiming to make Europe more self-reliant but still balanced within NATO. Post-Brexit, this approach has led Paris to view cooperation with the United Kingdom as necessary but functional — driven by pragmatic convergence rather than institutional unity.
Instead of returning to the EU’s pre-Brexit model, this dynamic now points to a pragmatic, issue-based partnership shaped by short-term geopolitical realities. The sustainability of this format of cooperation depends on whether both nations can reconcile their sovereignty-driven agendas with the urgency of strategic cohesion in a volatile Europe.
Geopolitical implications
The UK-France relationship is just one of several examples of European nations edging closer together in the face of growing uncertainty, pursuing industry-specific bilateral cooperation on the margins of broader European frameworks. The UK and Germany held a similar summit, also in July 2025, with the Kensington Treaty outlining 17 joint programs which the two countries have agreed to deliver together. This includes the Trinity House Defence Agreement, aimed at elevating the Defence Partnership to a new level in order to meet contemporary challenges facing European security. As with France, the agreements also include a joint plan to tackle irregular migration, highlighting the will of both sides to cooperate on building stronger law enforcement mechanisms. Further examples include the UK-EU summit held in May 2025, targeted at exploring new economic cooperation directions as the UK continues its foreign policy formulation post-Brexit. Crucially, the summit served as a ‘declaration of intent,’ creating the necessary political environment for the sides to pin down more specific plans in the coming months.
This revival of bilateral cooperation between the continent’s ‘leadership group’ is an important symbolic and geopolitical development. Greater European cohesion on the sidelines of EU frameworks will facilitate more coordinated and effective steps toward building European security. For some time now, several European nations have struggled to implement highly promising and ambitious defense pledges and commitments. This tends to be attributed to the difficulty of aligning the diverse national interests and positions of the countries, with finding common ground between 27 of the EU’s member states a prime example.
Nevertheless, given the turbulence and frequent military escalation which characterizes contemporary international affairs, it may turn out that more direct, bilateral frameworks are what Europe needs to begin the long-awaited process of taking its security into ‘its own hands.’ Otherwise, persisting with common solutions without first fixing underlying foundations is an approach that is deemed to continue failing. Should bilateral frameworks reinvigorate a sense of European unity and productivity, the security of both the European continent and the neighboring regions, which among several others includes the South Caucasus, will only strengthen further.
