As global political tensions intensify, the previously blurred lines of state alignments are becoming clearer. In the South Caucasus and the broader Middle East, this is observed in the emergence of new alliances and the strengthening of existing ones, with far-reaching implications for regional stability and international relations. While Georgia remains in geopolitical limbo due to its deteriorating relations with Western powers, the cases of Armenia and Azerbaijan warrant closer scrutiny. Despite recent progress in their bilateral peace talks \u2013 mediated in part by the United States and the European Union \u2013 the two countries continue to find themselves at the heart of geopolitical rivalries.<\/p>\n
This is not a new development in the external orientations of Baku and Yerevan. Those familiar with South Caucasian politics know that Armenia has been a close ally of Russia within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), while also maintaining strong ties with Iran since the early post-Soviet years. In contrast, Azerbaijan \u2013 whose territories were partially occupied by Armenia from 1992 until their liberation in 2020 and 2023 \u2013 has pursued a balanced foreign policy, avoiding military blocs and refraining from aligning with one power at the expense of its relations with others. At the same time, Azerbaijan has successfully built comprehensive partnerships with T\u00fcrkiye, Israel, and Pakistan, among others, leveraging its strategic position as a secular Muslim-majority state bordering Russia and Iran.<\/p>\n
These days significant developments are unfolding in Azerbaijan\u2019s relations with Israel and the United States, fostering a trilateral alliance based on shared interests in security, energy, and technology. Meanwhile, Armenia, seeking to counterbalance this partnership, is\u00a0aligning<\/a>\u00a0itself more closely with Iran, formalizing a comprehensive strategic agreement that bolsters Tehran\u2019s presence in the region. These shifts not only highlight the divergent foreign policy trajectories of Azerbaijan and Armenia but also underscore the broader geopolitical contest between Western-aligned powers and Iran\u2019s sphere of influence, with profound implications for the United States, Israel, and their regional partners.<\/p>\n Emerging Chances for Azerbaijan-Israel-U.S.A. Partnership Format<\/strong><\/p>\n Azerbaijan\u2019s burgeoning relationship with Israel has been a cornerstone of its foreign policy for over three decades, built on mutual interests and a shared understanding of regional threats. Israel views Azerbaijan as a vital ally in the Caucasus \u2013 a secular Muslim-majority state offering a counterweight to Iran\u2019s theocratic ambitions. As Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi\u00a0noted<\/a>\u00a0in 2021, \u201cAzerbaijan is an ally, a friend, and the largest supplier of energy resources to Israel.\u201d<\/p>\n The partnership spans defense, trade, technology, and energy, growing increasingly robust in recent years. In March 2025, Israel\u2019s Prime Minister\u2019s Office (PMO) underscored this alliance,\u00a0stating<\/a>, \u201cAzerbaijan is an important strategic ally of Israel in the Caucasus region, with relations encompassing cooperation in security, trade, technology, and energy sectors.\u201d This followed a Knesset motion to upgrade the strategic alliance, signaling Israel\u2019s intent to integrate Azerbaijan into a broader trilateral framework with the United States.<\/p>\n A key driver of this partnership is energy cooperation. Azerbaijan\u00a0supplies<\/a>\u00a0over 60% of Israel\u2019s gasoline, a role that\u00a0proved<\/a>\u00a0critical during the Second Intifada (2000\u20132004) and the 2023\u20132024 war against Hamas and Hezbollah, when Azerbaijan increased oil exports to Israel by 55%. The two countries are determined to upgrade the energy partnership. This month, Azerbaijan and Israel will formalize a previously announced\u00a0agreement<\/a>, securing Azerbaijan a 10% share in Israel\u2019s Tamar Gas Field, while also unveiling two larger energy initiatives in Israeli waters close to the Lebanese border.<\/p>\n This energy deal not only bolsters economic ties but also underscores a political shift, positioning Azerbaijan as a candidate for inclusion in the Abraham Accords framework \u2013 the first Trump-era initiative aimed at normalizing relations between Israel and Muslim-majority states. With the Trump administration re-taking office on January 20, 2025, prioritizing Israel\u2019s security and the expansion of the Accords, Azerbaijan\u2019s 30-year partnership with Israel \u2013 longer and more comprehensive than any other Muslim nation\u2019s \u2013 makes it a prime candidate. Leaders of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), meeting with Azerbaijan\u2019s President in December 2024,\u00a0acknowledged<\/a>\u00a0that past U.S. administrations underappreciated Baku\u2019s contributions to regional stability and support for Israel.<\/p>\n The trilateral aspirations of Israel, Azerbaijan, and the United States are not merely economic but reflect a strategic alignment against common adversaries, particularly Iran. Azerbaijan\u2019s secular governance and tolerance of its Jewish minority \u2013\u00a0described<\/a>\u00a0by Knesset member Simon Moshiashvili as \u201can exemplary, active, thriving, and especially united community\u201d \u2013 stand in stark contrast to Iran\u2019s repressive policies and hostility toward Israel. Baku\u2019s openness to cooperation with the West, including its thriving partnership with Israel, has made it a target of Tehran\u2019s ire. Iranian state media consistently urge countermeasures against Baku\u2019s ambitions and counter the emerging Israeli-Azerbaijani-American alliance.<\/p>\n Iranian leaders do not hesitate from questioning Azerbaijan\u2019s independence and its ethnic identity, claiming that Azerbaijan was a historical part of Iran and should return to the Iranian control.\u00a0For instance, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Ali Fadavi, who, in a\u00a0tweet in 2022,\u00a0reiterated<\/a>\u00a0these historical claims against Azerbaijan saying that this country \u201cwas separated from Iran due to the incompetence of the Qajar kings\u201d. Attempting to take the advantage of the Shiite believers in Azerbaijan, he openly called for a government change in Baku. \u201cThe people of Azerbaijan are Shiite believers who did not lose their original Shiite beliefs under the 70 years of communist pressure. As a rule, there should be a government that pays special attention to this Shiite majority of Azerbaijan\u201d, he added.<\/p>\n Azerbaijan\u2019s relations with T\u00fcrkiye, Israel, and the Western actors have provided a critical counterbalance against such threats. Likewise, for Israel and the United States, Azerbaijan offers an important buffer against Iran\u2019s northwestern border enhanced by the presence of around 20 million ethnic Azerbaijanis, Iran\u2019s largest minority, comprising more than 20% of its population.<\/p>\n Azerbaijan\u2019s strategic value extends beyond countering Iran. It is vital to Europe\u2019s energy security, supplying natural gas to 10 European countries as an alternative to Russian supplies, and serves as a\u00a0hub<\/a>\u00a0for the Middle Corridor \u2013 a trade route connecting Europe to Central Asia via the South Caucasus, bypassing Russia. \u00a0In July 2022, Baku signed a new\u00a0memorandum of understanding<\/a>\u00a0with the European Union (EU) to increase Azerbaijani gas exports to the EU from 12 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year to 20 bcm by 2027. Officials in Brussels certainly see the importance of diversifying energy imports away from Russia\u2014European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen\u00a0called Azerbaijan<\/a>\u00a0a \u201creliable\u201d partner in the bloc\u2019s renewed emphasis on energy security.<\/p>\n In November 2024, Israel\u2019s ambassador to Baku\u00a0noted<\/a>, \u201cIsraeli companies are now recognizing the strategic importance of Azerbaijan, not only as a partner but also as a crossroads between East and West \u2013 the Middle Corridor \u2013 serving as a gateway to Central Asia.\u201d This aligns with U.S. interests in developing alternative trade routes to reduce Russian influence, especially amid Russia\u2019s war on Ukraine, which has disrupted Eurasian stability since 2022. Azerbaijan\u2019s\u00a0support<\/a>\u00a0for Ukraine \u2013 including $40 million in humanitarian aid and free fuel \u2013 further contrasts with Armenia and Iran\u2019s assistance to Russia, reinforcing Baku\u2019s alignment with Western goals.<\/p>\n U.S.-Azerbaijan ties, historically focused on energy projects like the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor (with a 2022 EU deal to boost gas exports to 20 billion cubic meters by 2027), are ripe for expansion. Azerbaijan\u2019s contributions to the U.S. war on terrorism further solidify this partnership. Following the 9\/11 attacks, Azerbaijan was among the first nations to offer unconditional support, providing airspace and intelligence cooperation for U.S. operations in Afghanistan. From 2002 to 2018, Azerbaijani troops served alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan, with over 1,500 soldiers deployed in peacekeeping and combat roles, earning praise from NATO and U.S. commanders for their professionalism. Baku also facilitated the Northern Distribution Network, a critical supply route for U.S. and NATO forces, highlighting its logistical importance.<\/p>\n The relations between Azerbaijan and the United States survived a crisis period during the presidency of Joe Biden who was more oriented towards Armenia. In 2024, the Biden administration\u00a0re-activated<\/a>\u00a0Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act of 1992, which was\u00a0adopted<\/a>\u00a0on October 24, 1992, and bars the United States from offering assistance to Azerbaijan unless Baku takes \u201cdemonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh\u201d. The United States had granted annual waivers for this amendment since 2002. That year, Baku permitted Washington to use its territory to supply U.S. troops in Afghanistan. The reactivation of this amendment after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan took place against the backdrop of deepening relations between the United States and Armenia, exposing biased and transactional posture of the Biden administration.<\/p>\n President Ilham Aliyev, addressing the 12th\u00a0Global Baku Forum on March 13, expressed his confidence that relations between Washington and Baku will return to the previous positive path. Highlighting that the Azerbaijani government is very hopeful about the Trump administration, he\u00a0said<\/a>\u00a0that the reason is simple:<\/p>\n \u201c\u2026[T]he policy of Mr. Antony Blinken towards Azerbaijan actually ruined U.S.-Azerbaijan relations, which we had been building for 30 years. We have always been a very reliable partner and friend to the United States. When they needed us, we were with them. When they needed us in Iraq, we were in Iraq with our troops. When they needed us in Afghanistan, we were one of the first non-NATO countries to join operations in Afghanistan in 2001. And we were among the last to leave. After we left, they imposed sanctions on us. I remember it was a big frustration in Azerbaijan. I told some of their representatives, \u201cHow can we trust you?\u201d So, when you need us, you waive the sanctions. When you don’t need us any longer, you re-impose the sanctions. How can we build long-term relations with you?\u201d<\/em><\/cite><\/p>\n These developments provide a strong foundation for a trilateral format of strategic cooperation amongst Azerbaijan, Israel, and the United States. Azerbaijan\u2019s consistent support for U.S. counterterrorism efforts, combined with its strategic partnership with Israel, positions it as a pivotal player in such a strategic format. The Trump administration\u2019s focus on strengthening alliances with reliable partners offers a timely opportunity to elevate this cooperation into a formalized trilateral framework, enhancing security and stability in the South Caucasus and beyond.<\/p>\n Armenia\u2019s Efforts to Balance the Azerbaijan-Israel Partnership by Allying with Iran<\/strong><\/p>\n While Azerbaijan strengthens its Western-aligned partnerships, Armenia is deepening its ties with Iran, a move that threatens to destabilize the region and undermine U.S. and Israeli interests. In early 2025, Iran\u2019s ambassador to Armenia, Mehdi Sobhani \u2013 a senior figure in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) \u2013\u00a0announced<\/a>\u00a0that Tehran and Yerevan are finalizing an expanded comprehensive strategic agreement. This long-term pact, set to be signed by both country\u2019 leaders in the upcoming months, builds on an alliance that has intensified since Azerbaijan\u2019s 2020 victory in the Second Karabakh War, which extended its border with Iran by around 100 km. Sobhani, who previously coordinated Iranian activities in Syria, emphasized that the agreement would shield Iran-Armenia ties from external pressures \u2013 a pointed reference to Western influence.<\/p>\n Iran sees Armenia as a proxy and buffer against Azerbaijan and T\u00fcrkiye, actively opposing normalization efforts\u00a0like the Zangezur corridor<\/a>, which would connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave and T\u00fcrkiye. Economically, Iran leverages Armenia to circumvent Western sanctions, with a major Iranian trade center in Yerevan providing access to the Russia-led EAEU for IRGC-dominated industries. Reports of Iran\u00a0selling<\/a>\u00a0$500 million worth of weapons, including drones, to Armenia \u2013 echoing its support for Russia in Ukraine \u2013 further destabilize the South Caucasus. Armenia\u2019s history of facilitating sanctions evasion, such as acquiring Western-made airplanes and weapons for Iran, deepens its entanglement with Tehran\u2019s illicit networks.<\/p>\n This alignment is partly a response to Azerbaijan\u2019s partnership with Israel, which solidified during the Second Karabakh War when Israeli-supplied weapons \u2013 comprising 60\u201369% of Azerbaijan\u2019s military imports in the years preceding the 2020 war \u2013 enabled Baku\u2019s victory. Iran, which tacitly supported Armenia\u2019s occupation of Azerbaijani territory for 30 years, views this shift as a threat. The IRGC\u2019s 2021\u20132022 border drills and propaganda campaigns labeling Azerbaijan\u2019s leadership as \u201cZionist puppets\u201d underscore Tehran\u2019s hostility, intensifying as Azerbaijan opened its embassy in Israel in 2022 and deepened ties with Jerusalem despite regional pressure.<\/p>\n Armenia\u2019s stance also complicates ongoing peace talks with Azerbaijan, contradicting what State Secretary Marco Rubio\u00a0described<\/a>\u00a0as \u201cPresident Trump\u2019s vision for a more peaceful world\u201d in his March 14, 2025 statement on the completion of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace treaty text. Although both sides have agreed on the treaty\u2019s wording,\u00a0significant revanchist forces<\/a>\u00a0in Armenia continue to\u00a0advocate<\/a>\u00a0for military buildup and the recapture of territories Azerbaijan liberated in 2020 and 2023. Military supplies from France and India, along with Armenia\u2019s alliance with Iran,\u00a0embolden<\/a>\u00a0these forces, posing a serious threat to regional peace efforts.<\/p>\n The Azerbaijan-Israel-USA Format Is a Necessity for Regional Stability<\/strong><\/p>\n The contrasting trajectories of Azerbaijan and Armenia have profound implications for U.S. policy, particularly against the backdrop of fundamental changes the Trump administration push forward in the global politics. Azerbaijan\u2019s alignment with Israel and the United States offers a strategic opportunity to counter Tehran\u2019s influence, bolster regional stability, and expand the Abraham Accords. For the Trump administration, Azerbaijan\u2019s mediation between Israel and T\u00fcrkiye offers additional leverage to stabilize the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Asia. Its unique position as a secular Muslim state fostering Israel-Muslim ties aligns with the vision of the Abraham Accords. Conversely, Armenia\u2019s alliance with Iran and Russia threatens U.S. interests, from sanctions enforcement to peace in the South Caucasus. A trilateral Azerbaijan-Israel-U.S.A. format, rooted in decades of trust and shared goals, is not just an opportunity \u2013 it\u2019s a necessity for a stable, Western-aligned region. This necessity is underscored by Azerbaijan\u2019s proven reliability as a U.S. partner in counterterrorism and energy security, as well as its potential to bridge Israel and other Muslim-majority states, enhancing the Trump administration\u2019s vision for a peaceful world.<\/p>\n