The US-led blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has led Beijing to switch to continental suppliers of energy from Russia and Central Asia to offset the disruption of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf.<\/p>\n
Disruptions to energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz once again\u00a0reveal<\/a>\u00a0the structural vulnerabilities of global oil markets. As the world\u2019s largest crude importer, China is particularly exposed to such shocks. Historically, a significant share of China\u2019s crude oil imports has been sourced from the Middle East, with a substantial portion transiting the Strait of Hormuz.<\/p>\n An estimated\u00a052%<\/a>\u00a0of China\u2019s oil imports currently pass through the strategic chokepoint. However, Beijing\u2019s dependence remains lower than that of other major East Asian economies. By comparison, around\u00a095%<\/a>\u00a0of Japan\u2019s oil imports and roughly\u00a070%<\/a>\u00a0of South Korea\u2019s transit the same route. This demonstrates China\u2019s relatively more diversified supply structure than its Asian neighbors. China\u2019s exposure also extends beyond oil. As the world\u2019s largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG), about\u00a030%<\/a>\u00a0of its LNG imports are linked to flows via the Strait of Hormuz. A considerable share of these supplies originates from\u00a0Qatar<\/a>, followed by the\u00a0United Arab Emirates<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0Oman<\/a>.<\/p>\n Against this backdrop, the Hormuz blockade is not merely a disruption but a catalyst, accelerating China\u2019s shift toward continental energy suppliers and overland transport corridors. Over the past two decades, Beijing has pursued a systematic diversification strategy aimed at reducing its reliance on vulnerable maritime routes. As a result, non-Gulf suppliers\u2014particularly\u00a0Russia<\/a>\u00a0and\u00a0Central Asia<\/a>\u2014have gained increasing prominence. The current crisis has accelerated this shift. It has reinforced China\u2019s turn toward geographically resilient, land-based energy networks and a broader portfolio of alternative suppliers.<\/p>\n Russia Becomes Beijing\u2019s Fall-Back Supplier<\/strong><\/p>\n Amid disruptions to Iranian oil exports, Russia has diplomatically positioned itself as a critical fallback supplier for China\u2019s energy needs. During a meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing on April 15, 2026, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov\u00a0stated<\/a>\u00a0that Moscow is capable of fully compensating for any energy shortfall China may face due to the restricted supply of Iranian energy. Unlike Middle Eastern oil flows, Russian exports\u2014particularly via pipelines\u2014remain largely insulated from geopolitical chokepoints and naval disruptions.<\/p>\n Russian crude is\u00a0delivered<\/a>\u00a0to China via oil pipelines such as the Eastern Siberia\u2013Pacific Ocean (ESPO) route, which has become a particularly important component of China\u2019s import portfolio. By early 2026, Russia has emerged as China\u2019s top crude oil supplier,\u00a0accounting<\/a>\u00a0for approximately 19.6% to over 20% of China\u2019s total crude imports in 2024 and 2025. Imports frequently\u00a0exceed<\/a>\u00a02 million barrels per day (bpd),\u00a0driven<\/a>\u00a0by discounted prices on grades such as ESPO and Urals. These discounts are largely a\u00a0consequence<\/a>\u00a0of Western sanctions imposed since 2022 in response to the Ukraine crisis, which\u00a0have constrained<\/a>\u00a0Russia\u2019s access to European markets as well as to Western shipping, insurance, and financial services.<\/p>\n This deepening energy interdependence is even more evident in the gas sector. The operational Power of Siberia pipeline\u2014linking eastern Siberian gas fields to northeastern China\u2014has rapidly scaled up\u00a0deliveries<\/a>\u00a0to around 39 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually. Discussions are also underway to\u00a0increase<\/a>\u00a0gas flows up to 44 bcm per year through upgrades and operational optimization.<\/p>\n The bilateral energy relationship is set to deepen further with the\u00a0proposed<\/a>\u00a0Power of Siberia-2, designed to deliver up to 50 bcm of gas annually from western Siberia to China via Mongolia. However, this roughly 2,600-km pipeline remains closely tied to the broader pricing dynamics shaping Russia\u2013China energy relations. Despite years of negotiations, progress\u00a0has stalled<\/a>\u00a0primarily due to disagreements over gas pricing. China seeks to preserve discounted terms, while Moscow aims to secure higher returns to justify the investment. This impasse reflects a wider asymmetry in bargaining power. As Russia\u00a0continues<\/a>\u00a0to offer gas at reduced prices amid limited alternative markets, Beijing faces little urgency to finalize a long-term agreement. Consequently, the future of the pipeline remains uncertain. This underscores the fact that infrastructure expansion is not merely a technical matter but also a function of shifting economic leverage between the two sides.<\/p>\n China\u2019s Energy Bridge to Central Asia<\/strong><\/p>\n Beyond the Russia\u2013China axis, Central Asia\u00a0plays<\/a>\u00a0a vital role in shaping Beijing\u2019s overland energy architecture. However, similar patterns of constrained capacity and strategic recalibration can be observed across the region\u2019s energy corridors. Region wide pipeline networks\u00a0linking<\/a>\u00a0Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states to western China provide critical overland alternatives that bypass maritime chokepoints altogether. The Kazakhstan\u2013China Oil Pipeline, operational since 2006,\u00a0has<\/a>\u00a0a capacity of around 20 million tons per year (approximately 400,000 bpd) and typically\u00a0delivers<\/a>\u00a0250,000\u2013400,000 bpd, accounting for roughly 3\u20135% of China\u2019s total crude oil imports.<\/p>\n At the same time, the Russia\u2013Ukraine war\u2014particularly drone attacks on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) facilities at Russia\u2019s Black Sea port terminal at Novorossysk\u2014\u00a0has significantly disrupted<\/a>\u00a0Kazakhstan\u2019s oil export infrastructure, prompting renewed efforts to diversify routes. During the second Caspian and Central Asia Oil Trading and Logistics Forum\u00a0held<\/a>\u00a0in Baku on April 23, 2026, the Chairman of the Board of PetroCouncil.kz Assylbek Jakiyev highlighted the vulnerability of Kazakhstan\u2019s existing export system, citing disruptions affecting routes linked to the CPC. He noted that Kazakhstan is actively evaluating two principal alternatives, the Trans-Caspian route via Azerbaijan (the Middle Corridor) and the China-bound export route supported by existing infrastructure. Although the China route offers immediate capacity of up to 20 million tons annually, its current utilization\u00a0remains<\/a>\u00a0significantly below potential, at approximately 3 to 5 million tons, primarily due to operational constraints.<\/p>\n In parallel, the Central Asia\u2013China Gas Pipeline\u2014linking Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan to China\u2014supplies<\/a>\u00a0around 55 bcm of natural gas annually through its three existing lines (A, B, and C), with long-term agreements (particularly with Turkmenistan)\u00a0targeting<\/a>\u00a0up to 65 bcm per year. This framework is expected to deepen further with the\u00a0proposed<\/a>\u00a0Line D expansion, a fourth branch of the pipeline system designed to add 25\u201330 bcm per year via a new route through Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Although the project has faced delays since 2014 due to financing constraints and complex transit negotiations, it\u00a0remains<\/a>\u00a0a strategically important priority for Beijing. Once the long-awaited Line D becomes operational, the Central Asia\u2013China Gas Pipeline system\u00a0will reach<\/a>\u00a0an annual capacity of approximately 85 billion cubic meters, making it the largest gas transmission system in Central Asia.<\/p>\n Importantly, this infrastructure expansion is reinforced by recent high-level political engagement between the two countries. During a\u00a0meeting<\/a>\u00a0in Beijing on March 18, 2026, Xi Jinping and Turkmenistan\u2019s National Leader and former president, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow held comprehensive talks aimed at deepening bilateral cooperation across multiple sectors, with energy\u00a0remaining<\/a>\u00a0a central pillar. Both sides\u00a0emphasized<\/a>\u00a0the importance of expanding cooperation in natural gas, with particular attention being paid to the continued development of the Galkynysh field and the strengthening of long-term supply arrangements. The meeting also highlighted efforts to align Turkmenistan\u2019s development strategy with China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative, further embedding energy cooperation within a broader framework of connectivity and regional integration.<\/p>\n This momentum was further reinforced in subsequent engagements. During high-level talks\u00a0held<\/a>\u00a0in Turkmenistan in mid-April 2026, Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang and Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow\u00a0reaffirmed<\/a>\u00a0their commitment to deepening bilateral energy cooperation, with natural gas remaining central to the partnership. The discussions\u2014\u00a0held<\/a>\u00a0alongside the launch of new development phases at the Galkynysh gas field\u2014emphasized expanding the scale of gas cooperation and accelerating key joint projects. A central outcome was an agreement to further develop Turkmenistan\u2019s vast gas reserves and strengthen long-term supply arrangements to China through existing and planned pipeline infrastructure.<\/p>\n Shortly thereafter, T\u00fcrkmengaz\u00a0signed<\/a>\u00a0a $4.6 billion gas field contract with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to design and construct production facilities capable of processing up to 10 bcm of gas annually as part of the development of Phase 4 of the Galkynyshgas field. As one of the world\u2019s largest natural gas fields, Galkynysh\u00a0forms<\/a>\u00a0the backbone of Turkmenistan\u2019s export capacity to China via the Central Asia\u2013China pipeline network.<\/p>\n Still, Central Asia provides a relatively modest share of China\u2019s crude oil imports but remains a major source of pipeline gas, at times accounting for around one-third of the country\u2019s natural gas imports. Beyond their quantitative contribution, these overland supply channels are strategically indispensable, enabling stable, long-term deliveries into China\u2019s Xinjiang region under frameworks such as the Belt and Road Initiative. To some extent, they mitigate China\u2019s exposure to vulnerable maritime chokepoints while reinforcing its broader energy diversification strategy.<\/p>\n Beyond its deepening engagement with Central Asia\u2014especially the energy-rich Caspian littoral states of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan\u2014China is well positioned to expand its energy and connectivity footprint across the wider Caspian basin, where Azerbaijan is emerging as a pivotal energy and transit hub. Offshore production from the\u00a0Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) complex<\/a>\u00a0and the\u00a0Shah Deniz gas field<\/a>\u00a0underpins Azerbaijan\u2019s export capacity, while logistics centered on Baku\u2014supported by the\u00a0Port of Baku<\/a>\u00a0and its integration with the\u00a0Port of Aktau<\/a>\u00a0in Kazakhstan and\u00a0Turkmenbashi International Seaport<\/a>\u00a0in Turkmenistan\u2014could facilitate the trans-Caspian movement of hydrocarbons, including potential eastward flows over the longer term.<\/p>\n China\u2019s involvement in Azerbaijan\u2019s hydrocarbon sector\u00a0remains<\/a>\u00a0limited, particularly in core offshore oil and gas projects dominated by Western and regional consortia. Its presence\u00a0is more visible<\/a>\u00a0in renewables, technical services, and infrastructure cooperation across various regions of Azerbaijan. By contrast, China is far more active along the eastern Caspian littoral, particularly on Kazakhstan\u2019s shores. Through China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Beijing\u00a0controls<\/a>\u00a0about 86% of the Aktobe oil fields and\u00a0holds<\/a>\u00a0roughly 8.4% in the Kashagan oil field. It\u00a0is also more broadly engaged<\/a>\u00a0in pipeline and energy infrastructure, though it does not exercise dominant control over the sector as a whole.<\/p>\n Concurrently, Azerbaijan\u2019s growing alignment with Central Asian producers\u2014reinforced through multilateral frameworks such as the\u00a0C6 platform<\/a>\u00a0and the\u00a0Organization of Turkic States<\/a>\u2014is consolidating a more cohesive trans-Caspian corridor. This integration enhances multimodal flexibility and enables the rerouting of flows in response to geopolitical or market disruptions. Rising Asian demand\u2014evidenced by Japan\u2019s recent\u00a0efforts<\/a>\u00a0to secure crude from Azerbaijan\u2019s and Kazakhstan\u2019s offshore oil fields\u2014further underscores the system\u2019s growing multidirectional character. For Beijing, deeper engagement with this Azerbaijan-centered network is unlikely to generate immediate large-scale import volumes, given existing infrastructural and capacity constraints. However, this would reinforce a parallel, non-Russian Eurasian corridor, diversifying supply pathways and reducing concentration risk, while enhancing China\u2019s long-term strategic optionality within an increasingly complex and interdependent energy landscape.<\/p>\n Outlook<\/strong><\/p>\n Despite significant progress in diversifying supply routes and expanding overland energy corridors, China\u2019s energy security strategy remains fundamentally constrained by structural realities. The country continues to rely heavily on Gulf hydrocarbons\u2014particularly oil\u2014much of which still transits through the Strait of Hormuz. In practice, no combination of pipelines from Russia or Central Asia can fully replicate the scale, flexibility, and liquidity of global seaborne energy markets. Crucially, pipeline-based supply remains limited in scale relative to the vast volumes transported via maritime routes, underscoring the structural limits of overland diversification.<\/p>\n At the same time, China\u2019s pivot toward continental suppliers introduces a new set of risks rather than eliminating existing ones. Deepening dependence on Russia raises the prospect of strategic overexposure to a single supplier operating under sanctions, potentially enhancing Moscow\u2019s leverage over pricing and long-term contractual arrangements. Meanwhile, Central Asian energy corridors remain constrained by limited capacity, complex transit frameworks, and infrastructure vulnerabilities. Key interregional energy initiatives, such as the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline and Central Asia\u2013China Gas Pipeline Line D, continue to face delays, uncertainty, and political friction, underscoring the fragility of China\u2019s long-term diversification strategy.<\/p>\n To this end, the Hormuz disruption reveals a central contradiction in China\u2019s energy strategy. While Beijing has managed to reduce some of its most acute vulnerabilities, it remains deeply reliant on global transport networks, underscoring the persistent limits of its diversification efforts. Over the longer term, China\u2019s push toward renewable energy and electrification may further mitigate its exposure to external shocks. What emerges is not a fully secure system, but a more complex and layered one\u2014where resilience has improved, yet systemic risk remains deeply embedded.<\/p>\n