{"id":1863,"date":"2026-04-22T10:26:46","date_gmt":"2026-04-22T06:26:46","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/think-tanks.az\/eng\/?p=1863"},"modified":"2026-04-22T10:26:46","modified_gmt":"2026-04-22T06:26:46","slug":"baku-moscow-tensions-subdued-but-underlying-distrust-persists","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/think-tanks.az\/eng\/archives\/1863","title":{"rendered":"Baku\u2013Moscow Tensions Subdued, but Underlying Distrust Persists"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Executive Summary:<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Azerbaijan lodged diplomatic protests against Russia over President Vladimir Putin\u2019s comments on Karabakh during his April 1 meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, which Baku regarded as an attempt to reopen an issue it deems resolved.<\/li>\n<li>Despite accumulated grievances over the past year and a half, including the December 2024 targeting of Azerbaijan Airlines Flight 8243 and Russian strikes on Azerbaijan\u2019s embassy in Kyiv, the sides have largely compartmentalized disputes to protect economic ties.<\/li>\n<li>Azerbaijan\u2019s commitment to non-alignment keeps its relations with Russia open, but Baku is seeking concrete steps from Russia to repair relations, grounded in respect for Azerbaijan\u2019s territorial integrity.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\" \/>\n<p>The April 1 meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in Moscow was intended as a bilateral affair to manage the fraying edges of Russian\u2013Armenian relations ahead of Yerevan\u2019s parliamentary elections (<a href=\"http:\/\/en.kremlin.ru\/events\/president\/news\/79454\">President of Russia<\/a>, April 1). Instead, it unexpectedly injected fresh irritants into Azerbaijan\u2013Russia ties, already strained by a succession of grievances accumulated over the past year and a half (see\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/jamestown.org\/russia-azerbaijan-relations-remain-in-state-of-limbo\/\">EDM<\/a>, January 15).<\/p>\n<p>During his meeting with Pashinyan, Putin addressed the Karabakh question directly. He said, \u201cOf course, the most sensitive issue to this day\u2014and we recognize this, we discuss it often\u2014is everything relating to Karabakh. We come back to it time and again\u201d (<a href=\"http:\/\/en.kremlin.ru\/events\/president\/news\/79454\">President of Russia<\/a>, April 1). He repeated the traditional Russian narrative that, after Armenia recognized Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan in Prague in 2022, \u201cIt simply became wholly inappropriate for the CSTO [Collective Security Treaty Organization] to become involved in a process that had taken on an intra-Azerbaijani dimension.\u201d Putin further noted that thanks to Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev\u2019s joint efforts, and with active U.S. involvement, relations had been stabilized, and transport routes were being unfrozen. While seemingly benign\u2014and designed largely for domestic Armenian consumption\u2014the public airing of the Karabakh issue at a Russian\u2013Armenian summit set off alarm bells in Baku.<\/p>\n<p>Putin\u2019s statement that \u201cwe come back to [the Karabakh issue] time and again\u201d contradicts the current positions of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as both countries have been moving closer to effectively closing that chapter of the conflict. They are no longer negotiating issues related to Karabakh and are instead focusing on the normalization of their bilateral interstate relations (see\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/jamestown.org\/aliyev-and-pashinyan-jointly-receive-peace-award-in-abu-dhabi\/\">EDM<\/a>, February 11). Putin\u2019s justification for the CSTO\u2019s inaction also raises questions (see\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/jamestown.org\/yerevan-and-karabakh-separatists-divided-over-russias-regional-security-role\/\">EDM<\/a>, February 8, 2023). Putin himself dismissed the possibility of CSTO involvement during the Second Karabakh War. In early October 2020, he told the media that the war was not taking place on Armenian territory. Russian Presidential Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov further clarified that the CSTO\u2019s security guarantees \u201cdo not extend to Karabakh\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.themoscowtimes.com\/2020\/10\/07\/russias-security-guarantees-for-armenia-dont-extend-to-karabakh-putin-says-a71687\">The Moscow Times<\/a>, October 7, 2020).<\/p>\n<p>Azerbaijan\u2019s reaction was swift and pointed. Baku\u2019s position that the use of its Karabakh region for political speculation is unacceptable was conveyed to the Russian government via diplomatic channels (<a href=\"https:\/\/mfa.gov.az\/en\/news\/no14226\">Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs<\/a>, April 5). The formal protest was compounded by public commentary. Azerbaijani National Assembly Member Rasim Musabekov stated that Putin\u2019s statements on Karabakh was completely inappropriate, insisting that the Karabakh issue is closed and cannot be revived (<a href=\"https:\/\/ednews.net\/az\/news\/politics\/725564-\">EDnews<\/a>, April 8). He shares the common view that these references bring the loss of Karabakh to the forefront of Armenian politics before the June parliamentary elections and, as such, put Pashinyan in an unfavorable position vis-\u00e0-vis the Russia-backed opposition groups.<\/p>\n<p>The irritation in Baku deepened when Peskov subsequently added to the controversy. He said, \u201cThe question of Karabakh\u2019s ownership is in no way related to Russia; that decision rests with the Armenian authorities\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/tass.ru\/politika\/27005559\">TASS<\/a>, April 5). Far from defusing the situation, this framing\u2014appearing to minimize Moscow\u2019s historical posture toward Azerbaijani sovereignty\u2014only compounded Baku\u2019s indignation. The Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded to this statement. It reminded the Russian side that \u201cno country, including the Russian Federation, has ever questioned the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Azerbaijan, including the Garabagh [Karabakh] region\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/mfa.gov.az\/en\/news\/no14226\">Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs<\/a>, April 5).<\/p>\n<p>Putin\u2019s diplomatic spat over Karabakh was only the most recent episode in a longer pattern of tension. The deeper structural irritant in Baku\u2013Moscow relations remains the December 2024 downing of Azerbaijan Airlines (AZAL) Flight 8243 over Russian airspace (see\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/jamestown.org\/russia-azerbaijan-relations-remain-in-state-of-limbo\/\">EDM<\/a>, January 15). Russia\u2019s Investigative Committee\u2019s account of events appeared to absolve Russia\u2019s military of any blame, attributing the crash to poor weather and failed landing attempts. This investigation omitted any mention of missile detonations or shrapnel damage, points that Putin had himself acknowledged during his meeting with Aliyev in Dushanbe in October 2025 (see\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/jamestown.org\/putin-and-aliyev-meet-in-dushanbe\/\">EDM<\/a>, November 12, 2025). Baku\u2019s fury at what it perceived as a deliberate cover-up continued to simmer into the new year.<\/p>\n<p>Adding another layer of grievance, at the Munich Security Conference in February, Aliyev declared that Russia had \u201cdeliberately attacked\u201d Azerbaijan\u2019s embassy and infrastructure in Kyiv, Ukraine, on multiple occasions. He stated that this occurred even after Baku provided Moscow with the coordinates of its diplomatic missions (<a href=\"https:\/\/azertag.az\/ru\/xeber\/prezident_ilham_aliev_prinyal_uchastie_v_panelnyh_diskussiyah_v_myunhene_obnovleno_2-4021503\">Azertag<\/a>, February 14;\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.euronews.com\/2026\/02\/16\/aliyev-says-russia-deliberately-attacked-azerbaijani-embassy-in-kyiv\">Euronews<\/a>, February 16). Three attacks on the embassy compound occurred in July, August, and November 2025. Moscow denied intentionality, attributing the damage to Ukrainian air-defense malfunctions, but the repeated nature of the incidents lent little credibility to Russian disclaimers in Baku\u2019s eyes (<a href=\"https:\/\/tass.com\/politics\/2086875\">TASS<\/a>, February 14).<\/p>\n<p>Against this accumulation of grievances\u2014the airline cover-up, the embassy strikes, and now the Karabakh commentary\u2014the two countries have nonetheless worked to contain the damage and maintain the functional architecture of their bilateral relationship. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk\u2019s visit to Baku in early March was emblematic of this compartmentalization. Overchuk thanked Aliyev for providing prompt assistance in evacuating Russian nationals from Iran during the U.S.\u2013Israeli strikes, and the two sides discussed implementation of practical steps to resolve the 2024 AZAL crash issue in accordance with agreements reached in Dushanbe in 2025 (<a href=\"https:\/\/president.az\/en\/articles\/view\/71750?ref=oc-media.org\">President of Azerbaijan<\/a>, March 2). Overchuk noted that despite all the problems that have plagued relations in recent months, trade and economic cooperation have remained unaffected, with bilateral trade nearly reaching $5 billion in 2025 (<a href=\"https:\/\/tass.ru\/politika\/26615619\">TASS<\/a>, March 2). Russia also separately expressed gratitude to Azerbaijan for assistance in delivering humanitarian aid to Iran (<a href=\"https:\/\/report.az\/en\/foreign-politics\/zakharova-russia-thanks-azerbaijan-for-helping-deliver-aid-to-iran\">Report.az<\/a>, April 1).<\/p>\n<p>At the diplomatic level, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin and Azerbaijan\u2019s Ambassador to Russia Rahman Mustafayev met on April 8 to discuss prospects for bilateral cooperation in trade, economic, cultural, and humanitarian spheres. Both sides noted their \u201cmutual commitment to continuing effective joint work aimed at further strengthening multifaceted Russian\u2013Azerbaijani ties and allied cooperation\u201d (<a href=\"https:\/\/report.az\/en\/foreign-politics\/russian-deputy-fm-azerbaijan-s-ambassador-mull-prospects-for-moscow-baku-cooperation\">Report.az<\/a>, April 8).<\/p>\n<p>Baku has made clear that it has no interest in escalation with Moscow and no intention of severing the economic and other ties that bind the two neighbors. Azerbaijan\u2019s stated preference is for friendly, mutually respectful relations\u2014a posture consistent with its broader foreign policy of strategic balance and non-alignment in great-power rivalries. Overchuk\u2019s assurances that the AZAL crash would be resolved in line with Putin\u2019s commitments in Dushanbe\u2014including compensation for the victims and their families\u2014were received in Baku as a welcome signal that Moscow retains the political will to make good on its word. Baku is now waiting for those promises to be implemented. Concrete steps on accountability and compensation, more than any number of diplomatic communiqu\u00e9s, will be the true measure of whether Russia\u2019s expressions of regret translate into meaningful redress.<\/p>\n<p>The goodwill generated by Overchuk\u2019s visit risks being eroded by developments on the Armenian track. The instrumentalization of the former Karabakh conflict for Russian political messaging ahead of Armenia\u2019s parliamentary elections has left a sour aftertaste in Baku. From Azerbaijan\u2019s perspective, every time Russian officials reach for the Karabakh file as a rhetorical prop in their dealings with Yerevan, they signal that Moscow has not fully reconciled itself to the post-2023 regional order in the South Caucasus. If Russia genuinely seeks to stabilize its ties with Baku, then respect for Azerbaijan\u2019s territorial integrity and acceptance of the post-2023 regional order are prerequisites for the kind of relations both sides profess to want.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Executive Summary: Azerbaijan lodged diplomatic protests against Russia over President Vladimir Putin\u2019s comments on Karabakh during his April 1 meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, which Baku regarded as an attempt to reopen an issue it deems resolved. Despite accumulated grievances over the past year and a half, including the December 2024 targeting of&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1864,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[52,24],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1863","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-air-center","category-articles"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/think-tanks.az\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1863","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/think-tanks.az\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/think-tanks.az\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/think-tanks.az\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/think-tanks.az\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1863"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/think-tanks.az\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1863\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1865,"href":"https:\/\/think-tanks.az\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1863\/revisions\/1865"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/think-tanks.az\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1864"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/think-tanks.az\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1863"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/think-tanks.az\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1863"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/think-tanks.az\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1863"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}