I. Agenda of Russian-Armenian Relations<\/p>\n
On May 20, 2025, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov arrived in Yerevan on a two-day working visit. On May 21, 2025, he held meetings with senior Armenian officials. In the morning, the Russian diplomat met with Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, and in the afternoon – with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and President Vahagn Khachaturyan. (1<\/a>)<\/p>\n Having signed the consultation program for 2025-2026 between the diplomatic departments of the two countries (2<\/a>), the heads of the foreign ministries gave a joint press conference. A. Mirzoyan spoke about Armenia’s regional initiatives, emphasizing the unrealized “full economic potential of the South Caucasus” and called for unblocking transport routes to stimulate trade. To this end, the Armenian diplomat once again presented the “Crossroads of the World” project as a plan to restore infrastructure links and ensure the common prosperity of the countries of the region (3<\/a>).<\/p>\n Mirzoyan also downplayed the importance of rapprochement with the West, telling journalists that “Armenia has not applied for membership in the European Union, and no negotiations are underway on this topic” (4<\/a>). In turn, S. Lavrov emphasized the long-standing partnership between the countries, highly appreciating the “implementation of agreements at the highest level” in the field of trade and security, noting the achievement of a trade turnover of $12 billion dollars (5<\/a>). The Russian minister also announced that Russia plans to open a consulate general in Kapan to deepen ties with the southern provinces of Armenia. (6<\/a>) Regarding the \u201cCrossroads of Peace\u201d project, S. Lavrov agreed that in order to implement this project, Baku and Yerevan must first sign a peace agreement. (7<\/a>)<\/p>\n In response to the aggressive attacks of an Armenian journalist regarding the finished conflict in \u201cNagorno-Karabakh\u201d, the Russian minister actually confirmed the existence of the (unimplemented) Kremlin plan to postpone the final solution to the issue for future generations (8<\/a>).<\/p>\n II. Military-technical cooperation<\/p>\n At noon on the same day, Sergey Lavrov was received by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. In his opening speech, the Armenian prime minister spoke about the “current state of Armenian-Russian relations,” and Lavrov thanked him and emphasized Russia’s readiness to “develop relations with Armenia.” According to the official communiqu\u00e9, the politicians discussed the bilateral agenda, cooperation within the Eurasian Economic Union and regional security issues. (12<\/a>) Later, at a meeting with teachers and students of the Russian-Armenian University, the Russian diplomat said that the West was trying to prevent the consolidation of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia with their neighbors, in fact focusing on the importance of the concept of regionalism in the South Caucasus. (13<\/a>)<\/p>\n On the day of S. Lavrov’s arrival in Armenia, activists from the pro-Western party “For the Republic” staged a short protest in Yerevan, hanging large banners with the inscription “Murderer” addressed to Russian President Vladimir Putin on a bridge and near the Russian embassy. Within a few hours, the Armenian police removed the banners, and Armenian officials later distanced themselves from the action.(14<\/a>) The incident immediately drew condemnation in Moscow. A senior official in the Russian State Duma, Alexei Chepa, called the poster a \u201cprovocation\u201d and called on Yerevan to punish the protesters \u201cin the most severe form.\u201d (15<\/a>)<\/p>\n III. Robert Kocharyan\u2019s Long Interview<\/p>\n On May 19, 2025, about a day before Lavrov\u2019s arrival in Yerevan, former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan gave a lengthy interview to local media, in which he warned that Yerevan\u2019s current foreign policy \u201crisks losing everything.\u201d He called on the Armenian authorities to \u201cstay away from the EU\u201d due to the political-economic community\u2019s inability to resolve Armenia\u2019s security issues, and instead to restore \u201cstrategic partnership with Russia.\u201d<\/p>\n Kocharyan added that Iran should also be part of this future alliance and further accused Pashinyan of conducting a propaganda campaign aimed at \u201csowing mistrust towards Russia.\u201d<\/p>\n On May 24, 2025, the Hraparak newspaper, known for its closeness to government circles and insider information, published news about R. Kocharyan\u2019s two-day visit to Moscow, where a Kremlin official studying the domestic political situation in Armenia advised him to \u201cshow restraint\u201d in the matter of Pashinyan\u2019s impeachment.(16<\/a>) The newspaper also added that Russia has recently increased its interest in Armenia\u2019s domestic politics, and the Kremlin\u2019s new curator for \u201cArmenian issues,\u201d Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation Sergei Kiriyenko, is already studying the situation there. (17<\/a>)<\/p>\n On May 23, 2025, the Anti-Corruption Committee of Armenia announced the official filing of charges against the third president, Serzh Sargsyan. The third president was accused of accepting bribes worth about $2.985 million in 2008 in exchange for using his official position to facilitate a business deal. Prosecutors said the case was closed and would go to trial. Sargsyan himself denies his guilt, and his legal team promises to challenge the charges. (18<\/a>)<\/p>\n As for disagreements with R. Kocharyan, S. Sargsyan noted in his statements that he would not be against Kocharyan’s candidacy for the post of prime minister in the event of an impeachment. (19<\/a>)<\/p>\n IV. Bagrat Galstanyan’s plans<\/p>\n On May 25, 2025, in an interview with local media, the leader of the Tavush – for the Motherland movement, Archbishop and head of the Tavush Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC) Bagrat Galstanyan (Srbazan) said that he had been preparing people for street fighting for 3-4 months and that by 2026 the elections should be held without the participation of the Civil Contract. (20<\/a>) It is noteworthy that on May 15, 2025, the cleric announced a meeting with representatives of all political forces in Armenia, adding that meetings had already been held with representatives of the Country for Life party, the Hayakve civil initiative, political scientist Suren Surenyants, as well as with representatives of the Yazidi community. (21<\/a>) On May 27, 2025, Garnik Danielyan, an MP from the Armenia party, noted in a statement to journalists that Bagrat Galstanyan would announce further steps and large-scale protests in the coming days. (22<\/a>)<\/p>\nRegarding security issues, Russia\u2019s support for Armenia within the framework of its active participation in the CSTO activities was noted, as well as the 30-year operation of the Russian 102nd military base in Gyumri as the \u201ccornerstone\u201d of the security of the Caucasian country (9<\/a>). The minister hinted that the Kremlin had proposed a CSTO observer mission after Azerbaijani-\u00a0Armenian borderline clashes in\u00a02022, but that Armenia had rejected it in favor of an EU civilian mission. (10<\/a>) Lavrov also touched upon the issue of arms purchases, acknowledging that Russia is having difficulty fulfilling old contracts due to the war in Ukraine and therefore \"will not object to Yerevan purchasing weapons from third parties.\" However, the diplomat warned that buying weapons from countries \"openly hostile to Russia\" (France) raises questions about Armenia's strategic course. (11<\/a>)<\/pre>\n